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I. INTRODUCTION
Should damaging the natural environment constitute an interna-
tional individual crime in accordance with the provisions of the
Rome Statute, if committed under certain circumstances?
Contemporary international criminal law on individual responsibil-
ity is controlled by the Rome Statute of 1998 (hereinafter: Statute),I
which constrains the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction
(hereinafter: ICC) to "the most serious crimes of concern to the in-
* See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Dip-
lomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, at art. 8 § (2)(b)(iv), July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9
(1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998) [hereinafter "Rome Statute"] The term 'natural
environment' is taken from Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of 1998. See
generally, id.
** The author is a Post-Doctoral Minerva Research Fellow at the Max-Planck
Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, in Freiburg, Germany; a
graduate of Columbia University Law School, Member of the International Asso-
ciation of Penal Law, Member of the Law & Society Association and Bretzfelder
Constitutional Law Fellow. Special thanks are due to Prof. Dr. Hans-J6rg
Albrecht for his helpful insights, the Max-Planck Institute and the Minerva Fel-
lowship, for providing me with the resources and the environment required for
accomplishing this article and the Indian Society of International Law for inviting
me to write this article. The Article was first presented at the Fifth Conference on
International Environmental Law of the Indian Society International Law, New
Delhi, India. All opinions and errors (and, if applicable, errors of opinion) are my
own. I would like to dedicate this article to my very beloved future wife Lana, A
Special Lady with a Special Smile.
1. Note: In his book, Antonio Cassese is of the view that international crimes
may be held cumulatively to embrace other violations of international customary
rules, as well as rules intended to protect values considered important by the whole
international community and consequently binding all States and individuals, as
acknowledged by many international treaties. See, Antonio Cassese, International
Criminal Law 23 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2003).
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ternational community as a whole," 2 in particular, the crime of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggres-
sion (hereinafter: core crimes).3 As far as the Statute is concerned,
international criminal law is relatively a new branch of public inter-
national law.4 As such, it was only recently that environmental law
has become the subject of intensive legal development, a legitimate
segment of legal studies, a crucial study of international law and
domestically speaking, an eminent subject of criminal law theory. 5
Damaging the environment has always been thought of as a clear
case of wrongdoing. However, determining the nature and degree of
this wronging is of special significance in deciding between the pos-
sible legal tools required for protecting the natural environment in
general, and humanity in particular. The options at the domestic
level are clear: (1) administrative regulations, e.g. municipal sanc-
tions; (2) civil actions, such as tort law, e.g. nuisance etc., 6 and (3)
criminal law, for instance, enacting punitive statutes that affix penal-
ties for the commission of certain acts that cause environmental
damage.7 At the international level, environmental law is the spe-
cific subject of several international treaties, thus raising several
fundamental principles of environmental law to amount as jus co-
gent.8 Speaking on the subject of legal protection, Justice Christo-
pher Weeramantry, of the International Court of Justice, once ex-
2. See Rome Statute art. 5, The Court's jurisdiction is "complementary" to
national legal systems. See Rome Statute art. 17.
3. See Rome Statute art. 5; see also, Rome Statute art. 5(2) (providing that the
crime of aggression is not yet in force); see also, Rome Statute art. 8 (relating to
the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes); see also, Rome
Statute art. 70 (providing that the ICC has jurisdiction over offences against its
administration of justice, when committed intentionally).
4. Cassese, supra note 1, at 16.
5. See The River and Harbors Act of 1899 § 13, 33 U.S.C. 407, The Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899 makes it a crime to discharge refuse into a navigable
water of the U.S. without a permit. Id.; see also, Gray S. Lincenberg & David S.
Krakoff, The Environmental Crimes Case: From Pretrial Proceedings to Sentenc-
ing Guidelines (American Bar Association 1999).5See, e.g., Christopher Harris, Raymond C. Marshall & Patrick, Environmental
Law Series: Environmental Crimes (Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1992).
6. See Cassese, supra note 1, at 49-50.
7. See Francoise Comte & Ludwig Kramer, Environmental Crime in Europe:
Rules of Sanctions 217 (The Avosetta Series (5), European Law Publishing, 2004).
8. See Eva M. Kornicker Uhlmann, State Community Interests, Jus Cogent
and Protection of the Global Environment: Developing Criteria for Peremptory
Norms, 11 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 101 (1998).
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pressed the view that state obligations in respect of international en-
vironmental law, "may range from obligations erga omnes, through
obligations which are in the nature ofjus cogens, all the way up to
the level of international crime."
9
This article is concerned with the addendum to Justice Weeraman-
try's statement: Is environmental law compatible with the concept of
international criminalization? The question is not as simple as one's
intuition might suggest. The article aims to answer this question in
principle; issues of deterrence, efficiency, and "cost-benefit" analy-
sis lay beyond its scope.' 0 For this end to be achieved, one must
first inquire into international criminal law theory as exhibited in the
Statute, thus exploring the nature of international crimes, their his-
tory, evolution, development and purposes.
This article's point of departure is that international crimes gener-
ate a higher degree of condemnation than domestic crimes. 11 Part II
discusses the concept of international crime, from its historical in-
ception all the way up to its crystallization by the Rome Statute. It
also provides an analysis of the core crimes from four points of
view, thus examining the nature of international criminal commis-
sion focusing on the: (1) actor, (2) act, (3) state of mind and (4) harm
and victim.
Part III provides four basic conclusions on the nature of interna-
tional criminalization: First, no clear or coherent reason exists as to
why only the core crimes and their sub-categories are the only
crimes included in the Statute. The only obvious reason is the sim-
ple fact that the Statute is nothing but a formal codification of pre-
existing treaty and customary norms. Second: (1) international
9. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 66, at
142-43 (July 8, 1996) (reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 814 (1996)).
10. See Rene Provost, International Criminal Environmental Law, in The Re-
ality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie 439, 441 (Guy S.
Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 1999); but see Prosecu-
tor v. Erdemovic (Sentencing Judgment), 29 Nov. 1996, Case No. IT-96-22-T
(Trial Chamber I, ICTY), paras. 64-66, (concluding that international penal re-
sponsibility involves primarily deterrence, prevention of future violations of the
same norm, reprobation, expression of social condemnation of the offence and
retribution. Its secondary concern is the creation of historical records of interna-
tional crimes, and education of present and future generations. In any case, reha-
bilitation is not what international law seeks to promote).
11. See Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, Is Terrorism a Crime or an Aggravat-
ing Factor in Sentencing?, 4 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 1017, 1022 (2006).
2009]
268 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
criminal law targets individual actors who are criminally responsible
for committing 'international crimes,' regardless of their position, be
they state agents or private actors; (2) 'international crimes' address
severe acts against the international community, as a collective entity
or as individuals; thus shocking the man's conscience, if understood
in context; (3) although for the most part the Statute requires both
intent and knowledge as the threshold state of mind for international
criminal responsibility, the Statute manifestly considers conditional
intent (dolus eventualis) to qualify as intention - namely, the actor
means to engage in the criminal commission - if the actor is indif-
ferent to the result or 'being reconciled' with it; and (4) the concept
of 'international crimes' is not necessarily limited to the most serious
harms, but rather to the most outrageous actions. Third, interna-
tional criminal law is still undergoing development and the Statute is
far from competent enough to offer an ultimate coherent interna-
tional penal code. The Statute itself includes several provisions that
leave the door open for future international criminalization. Fourth,
the international community of nations is mistaken in adhering to its
reactive international criminalization policy that consists of waiting
for the atrocity to occur and then criminalizing the actions. Instead,
the international community must anticipate possible wrongs that
satisfy the threshold for 'international crimes' and from a conceptual
and objective point of view, amend the Statute accordingly and thus
pre-empt the occurrence of "international crimes."
Finally, Part IV opens with a clear and sharp statement whereby
environmental law is not an unknown creature to international
criminal law. There are some cognate concepts in the text of the
Statute, such as Article 8(b)(iv), which makes damaging the natural
environment a war crime if committed in times of international
armed conflict.
Admittedly, speaking of war crimes, I recognize no particular logic
for limiting such crime to armed conflicts of international character.
Moreover, it is my view that limiting such criminalization to 'war
crimes' makes no sense, because serious environmental damage
takes place, primarily, during times of peace. In times of peace, I
can think of many serious forms of environmental pollution (or other
damage) that are equivalent in their nature to other existing 'crimes
against humanity.' Such acts fit well under Article 7(l)(k) of the
Statute - which criminalizes other inhuman acts that intentionally
cause great suffering, or serious injury to body or mental or physical
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health - especially since the Statute acknowledges the doctrine of
dolus eventualis.12 However, I am not suggesting criminalization of
environmental wrongs by means of interpreting Article 7(l)(k); this
would violate the fundamental principle on nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine lege. Rather, I suggest amending Article 7(1) to either
include the crime of damaging the natural environment, as is the case
for war crimes, or to provide a more detailed definition of what
'damaging the natural environment' means.
Of course, no one can guarantee that such criminalization would
serve as Captain Planet to prevent environmental damage and in
turn save humanity from consequent atrocities. However, such pass-
ing thoughts are applicable to declaration of e.g. murder, torture and
rape as crimes against humanity.' 3 From my point of view, such
criminalization is essential mainly because it reflects the interna-
tional community's disgust and condemnation at outrageous prac-
tices that undermine the wellbeing of mankind. Environmental dam-
ages endanger the existence of humankind. This is not a myth any-
more but rather an inevitable, unavoidable and undisputable fact.
We must face the problem straightforward. If there is a hope on the
horizon we must sail toward it instead of waiting for the sunset - for
then it might be too late to act.
II. THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
International criminal law regarding individual responsibility is a
somewhat new-born sphere of legal studies, 14 normatively under-
stood as:
"...a body of international rules designed both to pro-
scribe international crimes and to impose upon States the
obligation to prosecute and publish at least some of those
crimes. It also regulates international proceedings for
prosecuting and trying persons accused of such crimes."
15
12. Rome Statute art. 30(2)(b).
13. See Rome Statute art. 7(1).
14. See Cassese, supra note 1, at 117; Povost, supra note 10, at 440,446.
15. Cassese, supra note 1, at 15.
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However, the notion of 'international crimes' is not a new con-
cept. 16 Until the 1 9 th century only war crimes 17 were considered a
genuine discipline of today's notion of 'international crimes,'" 8 as an
exception to collective criminal responsibility.' 9 Another exception
was piracy, which constituted a classic international crime between
the 17th and 19th centuries; pirates were treated as enemies of human-
ity (hostes humanigeners).2 0 The idea was that piracy took place on
the high seas and as such it urged special jurisdictional rules.2'
The formal codification of 'international crimes' as imposing indi-
vidual responsibility, took place at the Nuremberg Tribunal and the
other post war courts: 22 crimes against the peace,2 3 crimes against
humanity and war crimes. 24 After a long process of international
diplomacy in drafting the Statute's core crimes, the international
community's mind was captivated by the Nuremberg experience.
25
Plainly, the definitions of these crimes have undergone significant
development and embrace other treaties and customary norms26 that
evolved following the Nuremberg experience.
27
16. See William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal
Court 1 (2nd ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004).
17. Id.; see also, Cassese, supra note 1, at 6, 37.
18. See The British Manual on Land Warfare of 1912; U.S. War Department,
General Orders No. 100 of 1863, reprinted in Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman,
The Laws ofArmed Conflicts 3 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988) (1973).
19. Cassese, supra note 1, at 38.
20. Id.
21. Cassese argues that piracy was considered an international crime not for
the sake of protecting a community value, but rather because piracy involved mur-
der, torture, etc., over which states had no legal jurisdiction because these acts
took place outside States' territorial jurisdiction, namely, high seas. See id. at 15,
24, 38; see also, Schabas, supra note 16, at 26.
22. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 16, at 5-8, 27.
23. The crime of aggression is the equivalent concept to the Nuremberg's
crimes against the peace. See Rome Statute art. 5(1)(d).
24. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of International Military Tribunal
(IMT), Annex, (1951) 82 UNTS 279 (hereinafter: IMT's Charter).
25. Schabas expresses the view that the Rome Statute is not without serious
flaws, such as the lack of a definition of 'rape.' See Schabas, supra note 16, at 47;
see also, Robert C. Johansen, A Turning Point in International Relations? Estab-
lishing a Permanent International Criminal Court 13 (Report No. 1, 1 Joan B.
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 1997).
26. See Rome Statute art. 10; see also, Schabas supra note 16, at 28; see also,
Cassese, supra note 1, at 23, 145, 153. On its face, Article 10 allows for the inclu-
sion of customary international law as a legitimate source for expanding the pre-
mises of the Rome Statute. In my view, since the Rome Statute embraces the gen-
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But what are 'international crimes?' A formal approach would
suggest: "breaches of international rules entailing the personal
criminal liability of the individuals concerned (as opposed to the
responsibility of the State of which the individuals may act as or-
gans)."28 Unlike a comprehensive approach, which would initially
suggest an inquiry into the Statute, the formal approach examines
'international crimes' in light of the factors that crystallize a 'crime,'
in general and 'international crimes,' in particular. These factors
are: (1) the characteristics of the actor; (2) the features of the crimi-
nal act; (3) the degree of the required state of mind; and (4) the na-
ture of the harm and the victim.
International criminalization targets threats to the peace, security
and wellbeing of the world. It targets grave wrongdoings of concern
to the international community as a whole. 29 It purports to convey a
wide international condemnation upon the commission of outrageous
acts thus affixing penalties for their commission and guaranteeing a
better world for the future generation, as well as ensuring the preven-
tion of further atrocities. 30 The criminalized conduct itself (and/or
the consequences) shocks the man's conscience, appeals to his feel-
ings and captures his instant intuition. 31 The heinous nature of in-
ternational crimes is characteristic of their level of iniquity. This is a
source of great concern to the international community and for this
reason 'international crimes' mandate prosecution namely because
humanity as a whole is the victim.
32
eral prohibition on nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, such argument cannot
hold. See generally, Rome Statute art. 11 (1), art. 22(1), art. 23, art. 24(1);
consider, George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law 12, 23(FN 5) (Ox-
ford University Press, 1998); see also, Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, The Mean-
ing of Guilt: Rethinking Apprendi, 33(2) New Eng.d J. on Cri. & Civil Confine-
ment 501, 545 (2007).
27. Schabas, supra note 16, at 27.
28. Cassese, supra note 1, at 23.
29. See Rome Statute, Preamble, art. 1, 5.
30. Rome Statute, at Preamble.
31. Rome Statute Article 17(1)(d) demands that the ICC dismisses a case as
being inadmissible if it is not of "sufficient gravity." Id. art. 17.
32. Schabas, supra note 16, at 27.
2009]
272 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
A. The Actor
The Statute applies only to natural persons 33 -e.g. not states. 34 It
is not limited to state agents 35 who must, in any case, be treated in an
equal manner when the ICC has jurisdiction, regardless of any offi-
cial capacity. Official capacity shall not constitute any defense or
mitigating factor in sentencing. 36 Moreover, as a rule, the Statute
does not allow for a defense of 'superior order,' 37 and international
criminals are persecuted until their death through the fear of being
prosecuted because no statute of limitation applies to 'international
crimes.'38
33. Rome Statute art. 25(1); see also, M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Universal
Model: The International Criminal Court, Post-Conflict Justice 814 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2001); see also, Cassese, supra note
1, at 352.
34. Rome Statute art. 25(4); see also, Schabas, supra note 16, at 101.
35. On the contrary, Cassese argues that crimes against humanity are not iso-
lated or sporadic events, but rather are part of governmental (or a de facto author-
ity) policy. See Cassese, supra note 1, at 64.
36. Rome Statute arts. 27, 28.
37. Id. art. 28. 'Superior order' defense applies only when: (1) the actor was
under a legal obligation to obey the order, (2) the actor was not aware of the
unlawfulness of the order, and (3) the order was not "manifestly unlawful." Rome
Statute, Article 33(l)(b) speaks of "the person did not know that the order was
unlawful" (italics added). In my view, the second and third conditions, as cumula-
tive conditions, are very perplexing. If a person does not know that the order is
unlawful, then it is clear that he does not know that it is manifestly unlawful. In
addition, when the actor knows that the order is unlawful, then it is also clear that
he may not invoke the defense. Moreover, if genocide and crimes against human-
ity are clear cases of manifest unlawfulness, (Rome Statute, Article 33(2)) does
that mean that the defense is possible only in war crimes cases? But how can that
be? Is it not clear that war crimes are unlawful, given the detailed nature of Arti-
cle 8? If so, what is left of Article 28 on the defense of 'superior order'? See gen-
erally, Rome Statute.
38. Id. art. 29; Schabas, supra note 16, at 115; see also, Convention on the
Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity (1970) 754 UNTS 73; see also, Fletcher, supra note 26, at 7-23.
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B. The Act 39
The Statute's core crimes are the explicit manifestations of the
Nuremberg experience, 40 i.e. the Charter of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal of 1945 (hereinafter: IMT's Charter).4 1 These crimes
include: crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against human-
ity (hereinafter: Charter's crimes). As correctly observed by Cherif
Bassiouni, "The ICC's crimes are not therefore newly created treaty
crimes, because these crimes exist under international law."
42
While the crime of aggression 43 resembles the Charter's 'crime
against peace,' 44 the crime of genocide owes its origins to Raphael
Lemkin's manuscript in 1944.45 Its first reorganization as an inter-
national crime was in 1946, by the United Nations General Assem-
bly.46 It was subsequently recognized by the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 195 1.47
39. See The Document on Elements of Crimes, which are published in the
report of the first session of the Assembly of States Parties: ICC-ASP/1/3, pp.
108-55. This document is an applicable source for the International Criminal
Court as for the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 8;.see also Rome
Statute art. 9.
40. See, e.g., The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide of 1948 (articles I and III of the convention are almost verbatim to
article 6 of the Rome Statute); consider, Rome Statute Preamble (providing,
"Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been
victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity").
41. IMT's Charter, supra note 24, at art. 6.
42. Bassiouni, supra note 33, at 815, 817.
43. See Rome Statute art 5 § (2); see also, Bassiouni, supra note 33, at 817.
44. IMT's Charter, supra note 24, art. 6(a). "[P]lanning, preparation, initiation
or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing." Id. See Cassese, supra note 1, at 111-
117.
45. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation,
Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Carnegie Endowment for World
Peace, 1944). The crime of genocide was later included in the charges at Nurem-
berg, but ultimately the term "genocide" did not appear in the provisions of the
IMT's Charter, and the Tribunal convicted the accused of 'crime against human-
ity.' See: Schabas, supra note 16, at 7; see also, Cassese, supra note 1, at 96.
46. GA Res. 96(I).
47. 78 UNTS 277.
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The Statute's crime on genocide is, 48 as William Schabas describes
it, "a copy of Article II of the convention against genocide. '49 The
concept of 'crimes against humanity' first appeared in the interna-
tional arena in the Nuremberg context in 1945.50 However, since the
Nuremberg experience, this concept has been the subject of change
in its scope, definition, and substance. 5 1 Article 7 of the Statute re-
flects a combination of Article 6(c) of the IMT's Charter, Article 5
of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia of 1993 (hereinafter: ICTY's Statute), Article 3 of the
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda of 1994
(hereinafter: ICTR's Statute) and other specific criminal acts that
fall within the scope of "other inhumane acts."
52
The idea of 'war crimes' has domestic roots.53 However, its inter-
national origins are known as the 'laws and customs of war.' 5 4 The
Statute's concept of 'war crimes' is a codification of the IMT's
Charter conception,55 the Hague Law, 56 the Geneva Law,57 the
48. RS, Article 6; Schabas, supra note 16, at 36-41; see also William A. Scha-
bas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge University
Press, 2000); see also Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Com-
mentary (Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960).
49. Cassese, supra note 1, at 107; Bassiouni, supra note 33, at 815. On the
substance, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda best described the na-
ture of genocide as "the crime of crimes." See Prosecutor v. Kambanda (Case No.
ICTR-97-23-S), Judgment and sentence, 4 September 1998, para. 16.
50. IMT's Charter, supra note 24, Article 6(c); see also Cassese, supra note 1,
at 70-71; see also Schabas, supra note 16, at 37. This crime has its origins in 1915
regarding condemning Turkey for its crimes against Armenians, described as
"crimes against humanity." See Cassese, supra note 6, at 67; M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Crimes Against Humanity In International Criminal Law (2d rev. ed., 1999).
51. For example, the Statute neglected the requirement for a nexus between
'armed conflict' and the commission of crimes against humanity. See Rome Stat-
ute, art. 7; see also Schabas, supra note 14, at 43. Consider Prosecutor v. Tadic
(Case No. IT-94-1-AR72), Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Ap-
peal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, (1997) 105 ILR 453, (1997) 35 ILM 32,
para. 140; Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al. (Case No. IT-96-23 and It-96-23/1-A),
Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 83; Schabas, supra note 16, at 43.
52. Bassiouni, supra note 33, at 816 (footnotes omitted).
53. Leslie C. Green, "International Regulation of Armed Conflict," in M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., International Criminal Law 355-391 (Vol. I, 2d ed., Trans-
national Publisher, 2003); see also Cassese, supra note 1, at 16.
54. This term was invoked in the trials at Leipzing in the 1920s in light of the
Treaty of Versailles. See Schabas, supra note 16, at 3, 52.
55. IMT's Charter, art. 6(c). IMT's Charter, Article 6(b) defines war crimes as
"violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be
limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other pur-
[VOL. XlX
THE ROME STATUTE AND CAPTAIN PLANET
ICTY's Statute 58 and the ICTR's Statute. As it stands today, the
Statute provides a more detailed and comprehensive definition of
'war crimes.'
This evolution of the Statute's core crimes leads one to consider
the nature of the Statute: Does the Statute constitute a conclusive
work on international criminalization? I argue that both the lan-
guage and purpose of the Statute illustrate that the Statute is not con-
clusive. Why?
First, criminal theory is a living institute. A particular crime's
definition, scope and substance change over time. The history of the
evolution of the core crime is a living testimony on how the mean-
ings of 'war crime' and 'crimes against humanity,' for example,
have been the subject of serious changes and development through-
out history.
Second, the Statute's text provides several cognates thus support-
ing my view: (1) the Preamble speaks of "such grave crimes;" 5 and
namely, these core crimes are not fixed in the Statute, as they are, for
eternity; (2) I read Article 5 as composed of two parts: the first part
addresses the metaphysics of 'international crimes,' namely, "the
pose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity."
56. Hague Law concerned with the methods and materials of warfare. See
Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), 18
October 1907, including the Regulations annexed to the Convention.
57. Geneva Law restricts the applicability of war crimes to "grave breaches."
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field (1949) [Geneva I]; Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea (1950) [Geneva 1I]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(1950) [Geneva III]; and Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
on Tome of Ward (1950) [Geneva IV]. See also: Protocol Additional to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 (hereinafter: 1977 Protocol I); and
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977
(hereinafter: 1977 Protocol II).
58. Consider Prosecutor v. Tadic (Case No. IT-94-l-AR72), Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, (1997)
105 ILR 453, (1997) 35 ILM 32, para. 140.
59. Emphasis added.
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most serious crimes"60 and the second part focuses on the practicali-
ties of these metaphysics, i.e. it lists the most serious crimes with
which the Statute is concerned, namely, the core crimes; however,
Article 5 does not allude that the Statute should add to or detract
from these core crimes; (3) among other acts that constitute a crime
against humanity are, as Article 7(l)(k) provides, "other inhuman
acts of a similar character." 61 Likewise, Article 8(2)(b)(xxi), which
provides that "committing outrages upon personal dignity, in par-
ticular humiliating and degrading treatment," constitute a war
crime. 62 Both articles allow for future development of international
criminalization.
Third, Article 10 strongly supports this line of thought: "Nothing
in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way
existing or developing rules of international law." 63 The words "ex-
isting or developing" speak for themselves.
C. The State of Mind
The mental element occupies a prominent factor in the conceptual
definition of 'crime.' Taken together, the wrongdoing and the men-
tal state, if attributed to the actor, constitute criminal responsibility.
64
"Unless otherwise provided,, 65 the ICC's jurisdiction applies only to
criminals who commit their crimes with "intent66 and knowledge."
67
60. Rome Statute art. 5 (1998) (emphasis added).
61. Rome Statute. art. 7(1)(k) (1998); see also Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al.,
Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, 563, 565 (Jan. 14, 2000); see also Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998), Prosecutor v. Krstic,
Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 50-2, 498, 519 (Aug. 2, 2001). See also Bas-
siouni, supra note 33, at 816; Cassese, supra note 1, at 25, 81.
62. Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(xxi) (1998). I am ready to assume that both
articles do not violate the general prohibition against vague crimes because the
Statute itself prohibits such vague criminalization. See Rome Statute art. 22 ("The
definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by anal-
ogy...").
63. Rome Statute art. 10 (emphasis added).
64. Cassese, supra note 1, at 159.
65. See Cassese, supra note 1, at 171-75 (considering the phrase "[u]nless
otherwise provided" as a rescuing anchor, thus solving the arguable deficiencies of
Article 30 criticizing Roman Stat. art. 30 (1998)); Schabas, supra note 16, at 109.
66. See Rome Statute. art. 30(2)(a) (explaining "[i]ntent" is defined as "means
to engage.").
67. See Cassese, supra note 1, at 176 (stating it requires both intent and
knowledge.); see also Schabas, supra note 16, at 108 (suggesting "intent or knowl-
edge").
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This is the highest possible degree of the state of mind.68 However,
the Statute views awareness of the consequences "in the ordinary
course of events" as equivalent to 'intention.' 69 This is a clear adop-
tion of the dolus eventualis doctrine (conditional intent), whereby the
actor is indifferent to the result or is 'being reconciled' with it.
70
This is true as well for the Statute's conception of the definition of
"knowledge," which consists not only of awareness of the circum-
stances, but also of the consequences that occur in the ordinary
course of events.
71
D. Harm & Victim-Hood
While the crime of genocide clearly aims to punish crimes that in-
volve serious harm as well as protect only collective groups of a cer-
tain nature, i.e. national, ethical, racial or religious,72 its role is much
less clear in the context of crimes against humanity and war crimes.
The concept of 'crimes against humanity' concerns serious harms
such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, severe
deprivation of physical liberty, torture, rape, sexual violence of com-
parable gravity, 73 apartheid and "other inhuman acts that cause great
suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.",74
As for the victim, Article 7 lacks clarity. On one hand, the title
'crimes against humanity' would suggest the wholesale protection of
a collective.75 However, there are several provisions of Article 7
that contemplate the individual as a protected class in instances such
as torture, rape and other sexual offences.
76
68. Schabas, supra note 16, at 108.
69. See Rome Statute art. 30(2)(b) (stating "means to cause that consequence
or is aware...") (emphasis added).
70. George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 445 (Oxford University
Press, 2000); see also Cassese, supra note 1, at 161. ("[A] particular subjective
posture toward the result.").
71. Rome Statute art. 30(3); see also Cassese, supra note 1, at 164. The two-
fold requirement of intent and knowledge applies only if the specific provision on
the crime does not require otherwise. See Schabas, supra note 16, at 41, 55-56.
72. Rome Statute art. 6.
73. See, e.g., Prosecution v. Kunarac (Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A),
Judgment, 12 June 2002, 150.
74. Rome Statute arts. 7(l)(a)-(k) & 7(2).
75. Such as deportation and persecution.
76. Rome Statute art. 7; see also Cassese, supra note 1, at 64.
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The case for war crimes is completely different.77 Article 8 does
not confine its scope solely to the most serious harms. 78 Article
8(2)(b)(vi), as well as Article 8(2)(e)(ix), constitute war crimes as
not only killing but also "wounding," 79 taking hostages 80 and "mak-
ing improper use of flag of truce." As for the nature of the victim,
first, Article 8 clearly applies when war crimes are committed
against a single person. 82 Second, apart from human beings, Article
8 applies also to property, including e.g. vehicles, buildings and
flags. Third, it applies in cases of causing "widespread, long-term
and severe damage to the natural environment" (hereinafter: envi-
ronmental war crime). 83
There we have it. At first blush, environmental law seems to be a
stranger to the concept of international criminal law on individual
responsibility. But, it is not. Damaging the natural environment
constitutes a war crime if other conditions are met.84 However, there
is no clear acknowledgment of the 'natural environment' in Article 6
or -Article 7. While this could be understandable for the crime of
genocide, it is as much so for 'crimes against humanity.' Should it
be otherwise?
III. THE ROME STATUTE: A HAzY FuzzY CREATURE - Is IT?
Addressing the nature of the conceptual grounds of the Statute,
Steven Ratner once described it as a schizophrenic system of interna-
tional criminal law. 85 In his essay on International Criminal Envi-
ronmental Law, Rene Provost joins Ratner's position thus contend-
ing that the existing international crimes lack any coherent concep-
tualization of the role and nature of criminal law in the international
legal system. 86 Obviously, the inquiry I have provided so far in Part
II supports Ratner's and Provost's views. However, I am of the view
77. 'Genocide' and 'crimes against humanity' have a quantitative dimension.
78. Schabas, supra note 16, at 30, 55.
79. Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(vi).
80. See Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(a)(viii).
81. Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(vii).
82. Schabas, supra note 16, at 30, 56.
83. Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
84. Rome Statute art 8(2)(b)(iv).
85. See Steven S. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law,
33 Tex. Int'l L.J. 237 (1998).
86. Provost, supra note 10, at 439, 441-442.
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that the Statute allows for deducing four possible general conclu-
sions.
First, the only obvious reason for limiting the ICC's jurisdiction to
the core crimes, including their sub-categories, is the simple fact that
the Statute is nothing but a formal codification of previous existing
treaty and customary norms. Second, (1) the ICC's jurisdiction ap-
plies to perpetrators as individuals but not necessarily to state
agents; 87 in any case, it applies to all perpetrators in an equal man-
ner, regardless of their position or capacity. (2) The Statute is con-
cerned with severe acts that target humanity as a collective entity, as
well as individuals and singles. Either way, these are acts that shock
a person's conscience if they are understood in the context of their
commission. (3) Conditional intent (dolus eventualis) qualifies as
intention if the actor is indifferent to the result or 'being reconciled'
with it. Finally, (4) the concept of 'international crimes' is not lim-
ited to the most serious harms, but rather to the most outrageous ac-
tions. Third, the process of developing the field of international
criminal law, as represented by the Statute, has reached only the end
of the beginning; it includes several provisions that allow for future
international criminalization. Fourth, instead of anticipating possi-
ble wrongdoings of international nature and criminalizing them in
advance, the international community seems to wait for an atrocity
to occur and only then criminalizes such actions. This is true due to
the lack of a coherent theory on international criminalization.
It is true that the Statute is laconic. It is also true that the Statute is
far from establishing a coherent conclusive legal arrangement on
international individual criminal responsibility. However, it is un-
doubtedly true that the Statute, as it stands today, provides several
indications as to what suits the Statute's premises. In the general
context, the four conclusions I have already provided highlight these
indications. The question is whether - and if so, how - these con-
clusions can elaborate on our discussion regarding the possibility of
international criminalization of serious environmental wrongs.
IV. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Until the late 1960s, forms of environmental damage were not
taken as seriously as they are now. As Antonio Cassese explains: (1)
87. Id. at441.
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forms of environmental damage were not committed on a very large
scale; (2) states were reluctant to interfere with other states' man-
agement of their space and resources; and (3) there was not strong
public opinion on the potential danger of environmental damage.
88
In the late 1960s, serious instances of environmental damage caught
the attention of the international community as a whole: illegal
dumping in the high seas, damaging the ozone layer, global warm-
ing, releasing toxic chemicals in the high seas and other water re-
sources, dumping of toxic and other nuclear waste in the high seas
and illegal trade in ozone-depleting substances, oil spills in the high
seas, illegal waste disposal, including disposal of hazardous and ra-
dioactive waste and illegal trade in endangered species of fauna and
flora.
Accordingly, the international community could not stand by si-
lently. Several treaties were concluded thus imposing duties on
states to protect the environment, inter alia by domestic criminal
legislation. Provost provides a comprehensive survey of these trea-
ties: (1) the Paris Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
from Land-based Sources of 1986; (2) the Convention on the Pre-
vention of Marine Pollution by Ships of 1973; (3) the Basle Conven-
tion on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Waste of 1989; (4) the Convention on the International Trade in En-
dangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora of 1973; and (5) the
Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment
through Criminal Law of 1998.89
Truly, in the late 1970s, public opinion in this regard expressed
more concern about serious threats to vital environmental resources
at large and environmental crimes became the subject of criminal
policy. Criminal law is considered as having the capacity to serve as
a deterrent, preventing non-compliance with environmental law.
90
The adherence to domestic tools was, to a great extent an inevitable
step, primarily due to the serious hazard posed by environmental
damages. Such crucial steps would not have been addressed had it
88. Cassese, supra note 6, at 482, 488.
89. Provost, supra note 10, at 452.
90. See id. at 451, 453 (arguing that the fact that an increasing number of states
criminalize serious damage to the environment does not necessarily establish a
duty to do so, neither at the domestic level nor in the international arena. In Pro-
vost's view, "it seems probable that a treaty will be required before a crime for the
international or grossly negligent causing severe, long-lasting, and widespread
damage to the environment becomes a reality").
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not been clear to the international community that the wellbeing of
the world was at serious and imminent risk.
Bearing in mind the nature of environmental damage, including its
outrageous consequences and the nature of international criminaliza-
tion, let us once again ask the question with which we began the in-
quiry: should damaging the natural environment, in a widespread,
severe and long-term manner, constitute an international criminal
responsibility? To me, the answer is clearly 'yes,' for the following
reasons.
Obviously, causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to
the natural environment under certain conditions constitutes a war
crime; the Statute clearly provides this in Article 8(2)(b)(iv). Pro-
tecting the natural environment therefore, is not a strange animal to
'international individual criminal responsibility.' However, this en-
vironmental war crime is limited solely to circumstances of interna-
tional armed conflict. 91 In any case, outside the premises of Article
8, damaging the environment does not constitute any international
crime.
Originally, international protection for the environment was coined
in Articles 35 and 55 of the 1977 Protocol I, both of which protect
the natural environment in times of war. The basic concept embod-
ied in Article 8 is also located in the United Nations Convention on
the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environ-
mental Modification Techniques of 1977.92 The idea of criminaliz-
ing certain assaults against the environment was developed in Article
22(2)(d) and Article 26 of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind of 1991.93 These are the grounds on
which Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Statute is based. 94 Eventually, the
only reason for providing such a limited notion of international envi-
ronmental crime is the mere existence of prior treaty norms. How-
ever, if the Statute is concerned about preventing the outrageous
consequences to the environment and to humanity as a whole that
are likely to take place during warfare, it is only reasonable to think
such protection as extending to periods of internal armed conflict. In
91. Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
92. However, the treaty speaks of "widespread, long-term or [but not 'and']
severe effects (Italics and parenthesis added).
93. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english /drafi%20articles/
7 4 1996.pdf
94. Supra note 91.
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addition, most serious environmental damages take place in times of
peace. This leads me to examine the premises on which 'crimes
against humanity' stand and their compatibility with protecting the
natural environment.
Article 7 on 'crimes against humanity' was not intended to be con-
clusive. This was proved in Part II, thus relying not only on a pur-
posive interpretation of the notion of international criminalization,
but also on the Statute's text itself, namely, Article 7(l)(k), which
allows for the criminalization of "other inhuman acts of a similar
character," "intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or to mental or physical health." Article 7(l)(k) includes more
than the obvious. I argue that damaging the natural environment
suits the concept of 'crimes against humanity.'
Article 7 concerns serious harms that range from the severe depri-
vation of physical liberty, all the way up to sexual violence of com-
parable gravity to torture, murder and extermination, as well as
harms "causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental
or physical health." 95 Serious environmental damage suits Article 7
as well as to any other inhuman act that causes great suffering and
serious injury to humanity as a whole and to every individual sepa-
rately, to their bodies, to their mental and physical health, directly
and indirectly. Needless to say, such damages are committed in par-
ticular during times of peace. During times of peace the damages
are committed in a widespread and systematic manner - damaging
the ozone, global warming and polluting the high seas are only few
examples of this type of behaviour. Such serious damages are di-
rected against humanity with the knowledge and awareness of the
imminent, direct and certain consequences that these damages will
occur in the ordinary course of these events. 96 Furthermore, being
aware that the consequences will occur in the ordinary course of
events, which is the case for most serious environmental damages, is
equivalent to pure intention (the dolus eventualis doctrine). 97 In
conclusion, not only does causing 'serious environmental damage'
suit better the concept of 'crimes against humanity,' compared to
'war crimes,' but it also satisfies all the preconditions and elements
of the concept of 'crimes against humanity.'
95. Rome Statute art. 7(l)(k).
96. Rome Statute art. 30(3).
97. Rome Statute art. 30(2)(b).
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V. EPILOGUE: DEPORTING DOGMATISM, IMPORTING SKEPTICISM
"The point is not dogmatic communication, but investigation and
tender for examination on your part."
98
In another place, I have invoked a philosophical conceptual dis-
tinction between two schools of thought: Dogma versus Skepti-
cism. 99 In the context of legal theory, dogmatic argument is driven
by a set of beliefs which are accepted without argument. Obviously,
these are not arbitrary beliefs, but rather are based on reason,
methodology and doctrine; they are not about fiction. However,
dogma suggests paying no attention to evidence or other opinions.
Skepticism is located on the extreme opposite end. "But how will I
find such a belief?" Rend Descartes once asked; and he answered:
"by the method of doubt."' 100 Skepticism suggests a very cautious
methodology; it is a questioning approach towards what might be
considered as dogma otherwise. Skepticism doubts the nature of
right and wrong and requires not only reasoning but substantial evi-
dence. '01
The codification of the core crimes in the Statute represents a clas-
sic case of dogmatism. The Statute codifies that which has already
been recognized as a basis for international criminalization. Skepti-
cism calls for a principle inquiry into the nature of international
criminalization.
In another but related context, Henry Hart once argued: "a 'crime'
is... conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a
formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the
community."' 10 2 Criminal law is a dynamic system. In substance it
has to be stable, clear, coherent and proportionate. However, for
98. Karl Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt 9 (E. B. Ashton trans., Ford-
ham University Press 2000).
99. Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, The Meaning of Criminal Law: Three
Tenets on American & Comparative Constitutional Aspects of Substantive Crimi-
nal Law (2007) (doctor of law thesis, Columbia University School of Law).
100. Ren6 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641).
101. See T. Z. Lavine, From Socrates to Sartre: The Philosophy Quest 95
(1984). The authors point out that Ren6 Descartes is the father and originator of
modem philosophy and France's greatest philosopher.
102. Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs.
401, at 404-05 (1958); See also, Khalid Ghanayim, Mordechai Kremnitzer, and
Boaz Shnoor, Libel Law- A Criminal Offence and a Civil Tort: De Lege Lata De
Lege Ferenda, 25-28 (2005) (in Hebrew); Albin Eser, The Principle of 'Harm' in
the Concept of Crime, 4 Duq. L. Rev. 345 (1966).
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criminal law to be stable, clear, coherent and proportionate, it must
be as close as possible to the sentiments of the community. Assess-
ing the nature of international criminal law, Bassiouni once made the
meaningful observation that "[I]nternational criminal justice will
always be a work in progress, much like the pursuit of justice at the
national level."1
0 3
In criminal law theory, society's observations had a very signifi-
cant role in the history of criminal law development, referred to as
the 'social protected interest.' 1 04 This is true for domestic criminal
law theory as well as for international criminal law, which concerns
the views of the international community of nations. The 'social
protected interest' concept is the legitimacy for every criminal pro-
hibition.
The contemporary international crimes only came to be formally
codified following the miserable experience of World War II.105 As
for damaging the natural environment, Provost expressed his view
whereby there is no such thing as international criminal environ-
mental law at present. For Provost, a treaty is required before such
an international environmental crime can be articulated. 106
Rejecting Provost's view, allow me to recall the basic pillars of the
nature of international criminalization. It is the Preamble of the
Statute that provides that international criminalization shall be mind-
ful that, "during this century millions of children, women and men
have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the
conscience of humanity."' 1 7 These atrocities were never limited to
times of war. In addition, humanity as a whole is the victim not only
of armed conflicts but also of environmental disasters. While the
Nazi-like brutality was and continues to be a serious threat to the
wellbeing of particular nations, environmental disasters are primarily
a threat to the "wellbeing of the world."10
8
Given the context within which international criminal law has been
developed, both understanding the potential outrageous conse-
quences of serious environmental damages and comprehending the
conceptual notion of international criminalization compel imposition
of individual international criminal responsibility upon the commis-
103. Bassiouni, supra note 33, at 17, 825.
104. See Salmondon Jurisprudence 1 (12 ed, P. J. Fitzgerald 1966).
105. Cassese, supra note 1, at 16-17.
106. Provost, supra note 10, at 453.
107. Preamble, Rome Statute of the Int. Crim. Ct. (Jul. 17, 1998).
108. See Rome Statute, Preamble.
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sion of serious environmental wrongs. These wrongs threaten the
existence of humanity as a whole, risk the existence of humankind
and cause harm and suffering to the physical and mental health of
the human being.
In this article, dogma led me in one direction and skepticism in
another. I saw the better and approved of it. This article calls for the
international community to act before the horizon shrinks. In 2007,
Shimon Peres, the Israeli President, expressed his view that like ter-
rorism, global warming, as well as other serious forms of environ-
mental damage, constitutes an imminent threat to the wellbeing of
the world as a whole. 0 9 Benjamin Franklin once announced that 'all
mankind is divided into three classes: those that are immovable,
those that are movable, and those that move.' I choose to be one of
those who move, for "an easy task becomes difficult when you do it
with reluctance."110
109. Shimon Peres, Prime Minister of Israel, Opening speech for the winter
session of the Israeli Parliament.
110. Publius Terence, http://www.famousquotes.com/search.php? cat= 1 &search
=Diet.
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